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C O M M E N T A R Y
THE 2016 PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION
Why Did No One See this Coming? How Did 
It Happen? The 2016 Presidential Election
by L. Sandy Maisel
The 2016 presidential election was humbling for everyone—except for 
Donald J. Trump. Nearly everyone had 
it wrong. Most pollsters had it wrong. 
The pundits had it wrong. The media 
had it wrong. Hillary Clinton’s vaunted 
analytical team had it wrong. Donald 
Trump’s advisors had it wrong. No one—
except for Donald Trump—thought 
that Donald Trump would emerge early 
in the morning of November 9 as pres-
ident-elect.1
In this commentary, I will explore 
why Donald Trump won, why so few 
analysts predicted that victory, and what 
the Trump presidency might mean for 
policy in the years ahead. But I start with 
a caveat. I was one of those people who 
had it wrong. I underestimated Donald 
Trump during the Republican primaries. 
I underestimated him in the general 
election. I did not see his appeal. I think 
I know why—but—caveat lector.
HOW DID EVERYONE 
GET IT WRONG?
The nation’s pollsters are all reas-sessing their craft. For some time, 
pollsters have been concerned about 
nonresponse rates. Who answers poll-
sters’ questions? Who does not? Are 
the two groups systematically different? 
Pollsters know that response rates are 
different on telephone polls that are 
directly dialed from those on robo 
calls. They know that internet polls 
have well-understood strengths and 
weaknesses. Pollsters have not missed 
election predictions this badly in the 
era of modern, scientific polling, so the 
profession is concerned about whether 
their respondents represent the elec-
torate accurately.
Part of that concern deals with how 
they weight their samples. Every pollster 
knows that, given those who answer 
their questions, they still must judge 
who will vote and who will not. They ask 
filtering questions, to be sure, but they 
also make assumptions about the final 
turnout. Donald Trump objected to 
these assumptions when he questioned 
pollsters’ choosing which respondents to 
count. He may have been right.
At one point during the campaign 
Nate Cohn of the New York Times gave 
the raw data from a Times poll to four 
reputable professional pollsters, asking 
them to interpret the results. The poll-
sters’ predictions based on the same data 
differed, and they differed by more than 
a percentage point or two. The differ-
ence was in assumptions about how 
many African Americans, Latinos, or 
women, for example, would turn out to 
vote. Cohn and other poll aggregators 
made their judgments based on exam-
ining all the polls (and their own opin-
ions of the quality of individual polls). 
They were concerned because of the 
variation in the polls, variation based on 
differing assumptions about turnout. 
Near the end, however, the polls came 
together, and that gave everyone confi-
dence.
Wrong. The coalescence of the polls 
may well have been due to groupthink. 
Pollsters found a common ground, none 
wanting to be too far away from the 
average, but, in fact, they were all off. To 
be sure, they were within the margin of 
error of the national popular vote. But 
we elect our president on the basis of 
electoral votes won in the states. Pollsters 
were far off in key states because they all 
misjudged the turnout among working 
class white males who took their anger 
and frustration with governmental poli-
cies and turned them into votes for the 
outsider, Donald Trump.
Groupthink, the need for confor-
mity with a group’s consensus that can 
lead to irrational decisions, has long 
been a problem in politics (as in other 
fields). In 2016, the malady reached new 
proportions. Pollsters may have 
succumbed to it. Journalists and pundits 
almost certainly succumbed to it. The 
Clinton victory seemed inevitable, so it 
must be inevitable. The pollsters said so, 
and thus the aggregators said so. Even 
though Nate Silver of 538 said that there 
was a 30 percent chance of a Trump 
victory, that still meant that Hillary was 
a two to one favorite to win; Upshot had 
her odds at 84 percent; Huffpollster at 
98 percent. Who wouldn’t bet on those 
odds? And if the aggregators had her that 
likely to win, why should the media 
question that conclusion? 
Media groupthink was exacerbated 
by groupthink among the electorate. 
Those who favored Secretary Clinton, 
who thought Mr. Trump did not have 
the qualifications to be president, who 
were repulsed by what they saw as divi-
sive appeals during his campaign talked 
only to those who agreed with their 
views. They did not know the people 
who were flocking to the Trump rallies. 
They did not read the same newspapers, 
watch the same television news (or tele-
vision shows), or go to the same movies. 
They lived in another reality—and 
nothing in their world told them to reas-
sess what they believed. That is classic 
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groupthink—stereotyping the opposi-
tion as inferior and not reassessing 
assumptions—and it led to so many of 
us being wrong.
So on Tuesday, November 8, we 
waited for the inevitable—for the first 
woman to be elected president—except 
for Donald Trump who heard a different 
beat.
WHY DID TRUMP WIN? 
Now we get to the blame game. At least for the Clinton camp.
Here is what we know. First, Hillary 
Clinton did not hold the Obama coali-
tion together strongly enough. African 
Americans supported her, but by 5 
percentage points less (88 percent as 
opposed to 93 percent) than they had 
President Obama. In addition, fewer 
African Americans turned out, especially 
in urban centers of the Rust Belt. No 
surprise really. President Obama was the 
first African American candidate with a 
major party nomination for president; 
while he and the First Lady Michelle 
Obama passionately urged their backers 
to support his chosen successor, Clinton 
was not Obama. Similarly, Latinos 
supported Clinton in about the same 
percentage as they had Obama—and 
their turnout was about the same. But 
these numbers also did not meet expecta-
tions. Given candidate Trump’s rhetoric 
and the growth in the Latino population, 
the thought was that Clinton would win 
a higher percentage of these voters, and 
the absolute number, in places like 
Florida, would be higher. Wrong again.
Second, college-educated women 
did not turn out to vote for Hillary 
Clinton in the numbers that had been 
anticipated. In fact, she won the women’s 
vote by only 1 percent more than 
Obama had four years earlier, hardly a 
resounding win over a candidate dubbed 
misogynistic. Why was this the case? 
Most of us refused to face the fact that 
Hillary Clinton was a very unpopular 
candidate. In early polling, college-edu-
cated women were supporting her over 
Donald Trump, not because they were 
ardent Clinton supporters, but because 
they deemed him worse. We heard 
repeatedly that these were the two least 
popular candidates ever to run against 
each other for president. We knew that 
some people liked Trump, some liked 
Clinton, and many liked neither. We did 
not hear much about how those who 
disliked both were making their deci-
sions. The assumption was that women 
(and Latinos) would vote for Clinton—
and that Trump could not overcome 
those losses.
Why did this result not eventuate? 
Two reasons. First, Secretary Clinton 
came to this campaign with baggage, 
and she never dealt with it. The email 
scandal never went away. The sense that 
she felt she should be treated differently 
never went away. Her campaign was 
blind to the optics of the Goldman 
Sachs speeches, of Bill Clinton’s airport 
visit with Attorney General Lynch, of 
how much she was viewed as part of the 
establishment elite that placed itself 
above every day citizens. Second, I 
believe that FBI Director James Comey’s 
October surprise—his announcement 
nine days before the election that the 
FBI was looking into emails found on 
Clinton aide Huma Abedin’s computer—
reminded many of the women on whom 
Clinton was counting about all of these 
factors, about what they disliked about 
her. And these college-educated, 
suburban voters returned to their normal 
preference, voting for the Republican 
they did not like more than the 
Democrat they did not like. To be sure, 
Clinton still won among these voters, 
but not by as much as was predicted.
Third, working-class white males 
(an inexact term used to describe male 
voters in the exurbs of Midwestern cities) 
voted in higher numbers and against the 
Democrat in higher numbers than 
anyone predicted. Why? I think the 
reasons are complex. We cannot ignore a 
certain amount of basic sexism. It is hard 
to deny that Secretary Clinton was 
treated differently as a candidate because 
she is a woman. For some, the historic 
nature of her candidacy was a plus. But 
clearly for some, maybe especially those 
who work in a male-dominated environ-
ment and who have not been used to 
women in positions of authority, her 
gender was a problem—and they 
responded to questions about her 
stamina, her health, her ability to lead in 
a forceful way.
More specifically, these are citizens 
who have not benefited from globaliza-
tion, whose jobs were put in jeopardy by 
NAFTA (North American Free Trade 
Agreement) (which they associate with 
Clinton), but most importantly, who 
did not feel that the Democratic Party or 
Secretary Clinton cared about them. The 
Democratic Party took them for granted, 
and Donald Trump did not. Party 
leaders assumed that these voters knew 
that the Democrats were the party of 
working people, but the voters’ experi-
ences were different. Donald Trump 
campaigned in their small towns and 
neighborhoods. Secretary Clinton and 
the news media flew right over them, 
never stopping to hear what they were 
thinking. Worst of all, Secretary Clinton 
lumped them with extremist Trump 
supporters as “deplorables.” In these 
voters’ minds, they are not deplorable; 
they are hardworking people trying to 
make ends meet in a difficult time who 
saw the party they had supported ignore 
them. If an inclusive Democratic Party 
ignored them, they were willing to be 
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excluded. Bernie Sanders understood 
this feeling of dissatisfaction during the 
primary season, but the Clinton 
campaign never crafted a message that 
included those who were suffering 
economically as well as those who 
suffered because of years of systemic 
exclusion. 
We also know that Secretary Clinton 
won the popular vote by nearly 2.9 
million votes. Wow! More than many 
Electoral College winners, including 
John Kennedy. But we also know that 
she won California and New York by a 
combined 5 million votes—and lost the 
rest of the country by about 2.1 million. 
If nothing else, that should tell us some-
thing about how different those two 
states—the headquarters of every major 
media outlet in the nation—are from 
the rest of the country. When one adds 
that Secretary Clinton won over 92 
percent of the vote in the District of 
Columbia, the division becomes clearer. 
For citizens living in a wide swath of the 
country, Secretary Clinton was a very 
bad candidate, the wrong person for the 
wrong time.
WHAT DOES THIS ELECTION 
MEAN FOR THE FUTURE? 
Remember, reader beware! Many ardent liberals feel that the end is 
near. Everything that they have fought 
for—rights for minorities, peace, or the 
environment, for example—is lost. They 
are protesting (“Not my president”), 
signing petitions, and bemoaning every 
signal (for example, the appointment of 
Steve Bannon as chief strategist) that the 
Trump presidency will be as bad as they 
anticipated.
I understand those feelings and 
share many of them. To be sure, the 
years ahead will be ones in which we 
who share those feelings must look out 
for each other, speak clearly when rights 
are being violated, and continue to fight 
battles we have fought for many years. 
But in American politics, battles that 
have been won must always be re-won, 
no victory is forever, and vigilance is 
always needed.
I also am the ultimate believer in 
the American system of government. For 
the last eight years, liberals have been 
restrained and have had to accept partial 
victories because the system favors 
moving slowly and gives those who favor 
the status quo many opportunities to 
oppose change. Now those seeking to 
roll back the progress on civil rights, 
LGBTQ (lesbian, gay, bisexual, trans-
gender, and queer) rights, the environ-
ment, and other issues will be thwarted 
in their efforts. That is not a positive sign 
for liberals, but it signals a strategy 
moving forward. As President Obama 
said after his initial meeting in the Oval 
Office with President-elect Trump, 
Donald Trump is a pragmatist, not an 
ideologue. To be sure, his rhetoric flamed 
the worst passions of ideologues of the 
far right, and I think we have a legiti-
mate concern about the image of 
America portrayed in off-the-cuff 
comments by our elected president. But 
that does not mean all of his supporters 
share those views—they do not—nor 
does it mean that he will govern from 
that perspective. In the years ahead, the 
job of those who opposed his candidacy 
is to support him when he moves to the 
center and oppose him when he leans in 
the direction of those supporters. The 
system is designed to help in that strategy.
Finally, we must learn the right 
lessons from this campaign. In my mind, 
the key lesson is to listen to voters 
throughout the nation, to understand 
the impact of economic inequality on 
voters everywhere in America, and to 
find common ground where we are now 
divided. To me, patriots are those who 
believe in American progress and the 
American promise for all people, not just 
those with whom we are immediately 
concerned. Defining greatness in those 
inclusive terms, not in retrogressive, 
divisive terms, is the challenge of the 
coming years.  -
ENDNOTES
1 To be fair, political scientists who based 
their predictions on factors known 
before the two parties’ nominations—
and who did not change their predic-
tion—foresaw a Republican win. Also 
American University historian Allan 
Lichtman made his ninth straight accu-
rate prediction based on 13 true/false 
questions answered months before  
the election. See https://www 
.washingtonpost.com/news/the-fix 
/wp/2016/10/28/professor-whos 
-predicted-30-years-of-presidential 
-elections-correctly-is-doubling 
-down-on-a-trump-win/?utm 
_term=.5ed2b92263b9
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